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Abstract
Radner (1979) introduces a general equilibrium model of asymmetric informa-
tion, where agents have a model "of how equilibrium prices are determined", with-
out which they could not update their beliefs. Di¤erently, De Boisde¤re (2016, [3])
shows that agents, having private anticipations and no price model, can still up-
date their beliefs from observing trade on nancial markets, until all arbitrage is
precluded. Then, inferences consist in successively eliminating anticipations, which
would grant an unlimited arbitrage, if realizable. Thus, in our model, agents learn
from arbitrage opportunities on portfolios, as they would do on actual markets. This
model is consistent with all kinds of assets and uncountably many forecasts. We now
characterize arbitrage-free markets, and show that the information markets may re-
veal depends on the span of asset payo¤s in agentscommonly expected states. We
provide conditions, under which markets are non-informative or typically revealing.
Key words: anticipations, inferences, perfect foresight, rational expectations, -
nancial markets, asymmetric information, arbitrage.
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1 Introduction
Asymmetrically informed agents may infer information from observing prices or
trade volumes on markets. Thus, in the Radner (1979) rational expectation setting
agents have a modelor expectationsof how equilibrium prices are determined.
They may infer private information of other agents from comparing actual prices and
price expectations with their theoretical values at a price revealing equilibrium. Yet,
equilibrium may fail to exist. Existence in Radners model only holds generically.
Hereafter, we drop both Radners (1972, 1979) classical assumptions that agents
have rational expectations and a perfect foresight of future prices. Instead, we con-
sider a two-period model with uncountably many states, also called anticipations,
expectations or forecasts. The state space captures the exogenous uncertainty, stem-
ming from natures play over future events, and also, typically, an endogenous un-
certainty, resulting from the fact that agentscharacteristics, forecasts and beliefs
may be private. Agentsforecasts form idiosyncratic subsets of the state space.
Assets of any kind may be exchanged at the rst period, whose payo¤s, at the
second, are state dependent. Starting from their idiosyncratic sets of anticipations,
agents may update their beliefs from observing portfolios, and successively elimi-
nating forecasts, that would grant an arbitrage, as in De Boisde¤re (2016, [3]).
The current paper studies the payo¤ structure of arbitrage-free markets, and the
information markets may reveal. It shows this information depends on the span of
asset payo¤s in agents commonly expected states. It provides conditions, under
which markets are non-revealing or, typically, partially or fully revealing. In partic-
ular, when agents have perfect foresight, dropping Radners (1979) assumption not
1
 
Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2016.42
only restores the full existence property of equilibrium, along De Boisde¤re (2007),
but provides insights on the information agents reach.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents De Boisde¤res (2016, [3])
model and its main results. Section 3 studies the information markets may convey.
Section 4 concludes.
2 The model
We consider a pure-exchange economy with two periods (t 2 f0; 1g) and nitely
many agents, i 2 I := f1; :::;mg, having uncertainty at the rst period about which
state, !, will prevail tomorrow out of a state space, denoted by 
, which stands for
any open subset with cardinality of the continuum of a metric space (e.g., 
 :=]0; 1[).
States are also called forecasts, anticipations or expectations.
At t = 0, each agent, i 2 I, receives a private information signal, in the form
of a compact sub-set, 
i, of 
, informing her that tomorrows state will be in

i. She then elects a probabilty distribution, i, on (
;B(
)), called her belief,
whose support is 
i. The information structure, (
i; i)i2I , is given throughout,
with 
 := \i2I
i 6= ?. It may be rened from observing markets. Then, each agent,
i 2 I, reduces her forcasts to a subset of 
i, and consistently updates her belief.
Agents exchange nitely many assets, j 2 J := f1; :::; Jg, at t = 0, whose cash
payo¤s, vj(!) 2 R, are conditional on the occurence of a state ! 2 
, at t = 1, and
dene a row vector, V (!) = (vj(!)) 2 RJ . The mapping ! 2 
 7! V (!) is assumed to
be continuous. Agentspositions in assets dene portfolios, z 2 RJ . Given an asset
price, q 2 RJ , a portofolio, z 2 RJ , costs q  z units of account at t = 0, and promises
V (!)  z units tomorrow, in each state, ! 2 
, if ! obtains. We now present arbitrage.
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Denition 1 A price, q 2 RJ , is said to be a common no-arbitrage price of (
i)i2I ,
or the structure (
i)i2I to be q-arbitrage-free, if the following condition holds:
(a) @(i;z) 2 I  RJ :  q  z > 0 and V (!)  z > 0, 8! 2 
i, with one strict inequality.
A structure, which admits a common no-arbitrage price, is called arbitrage-free.
We recall the following Claim, whose proof is given in De Boisde¤re (2016, [3]).
Claim 1 Let q 2 RJ be given. For each i 2 I, we denote by L++2 (i) the set of
mappings, f : 
i ! R, in the Riesz space L2(i), such that f(!) > 0 i-almost surely.
The following statements are equivalent:
(i) q 2 Qc[(
i)], that is, (
i) is q-arbitrage free;
(ii) 8i 2 I, 9fi 2 L++2 (i), such that q =
R
!2
i V (!)fi(!)di(!);
Besides, (
i) is arbitrage-free if and only if it meets the following AFAO Condition:
(iii) @(zi) 2 (RJ)m :
Pm
i=1 zi = 0, V (!i)  zi > 0; 8(i; !i) 2 I  
i, one at least being strict.
De Boisde¤re (2016, [3]) shows that, if (
i)i2I is arbitrage-free, agents cannot
infer information and, otherwise, that they may always infer one unique coarsest
arbitrage-free renement, (
i )i2I , of (
i)i2I , such that 
  
i  
i, for each
i 2 I, from observing arbitrage opportunities on portfolios. They may then elect
any consistent beliefs, (i )i2I . Throughout, we refer to (


i ; 

i )i2I , or (


i )i2I , as
the nal information structure. Moreover, (
i )i2I=(
i)i2I if and only if (
i)i2I is
arbitrage-free at the outset. We now study what information markets may reveal.
3 Information markets may reveal
To simplify exposition, anticipation sets, 
i (for each i 2 I), are, at rst, nite
and we let S :=[i2I 
i and S:=[i2I 
i . State prices replace mappings in Claim 1-(ii).
3
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We dene (for some J 6 J, with a slight abuse in notations) the SJ and SJ ma-
trixes, V := (V (!)) := (vj(!))j2f1;:::;Jg;!2S and V
:= (V (!)) := (vj(!))j2f1;:::;Jg;!2S , from
the payo¤ mapping of Section 2, by costlessly eliminating redundant assets, and:
 Z!:= f z 2 RJ : V (!)  z = 0 g, for each ! 2 S, and Z?! its orthogonal;
 Z!:= f z 2 RJ

: V (!)  z = 0 g, for each ! 2 S, and Z?! its orthogonal;
 Zi:= \!2
iZ!, for each i 2 I, Z =
P
i2I Zi, and their orthogonals, Z?i , Z? = \i2IZ?i ;
 Z = \!2
Z!, Z = \!2
Z!, and their orthogonals, Z? and Z?;
 Zi := \!2
iZ!, for each i 2 I, Z =
P
i2I Z

i and their orthogonals, Z?i , Z?;
 W!, the straight line of RJ , generated by w! := (vj(!))j2f1;:::;Jg, for each ! 2 S;
 W := P!2
W! and their orthogonals, W?! and W?.
 We similarly dene W !, w!, for each ! 2 S, W  and orthogonals.
Claim 3 The above vector spaces meet the following Assertions:
(i) W! = Z
?
! , 8! 2 S, and W ! = Z?! , 8! 2 S;
(ii) RJ =
P
i2I Z
?
i and RJ

=
P
i2I Z
?
i ;
(iii) Z  Z = W? and Z  Z = W ?;
(iv) (
i ) = (
i) if and only if the following condition holds:
(I) @(zi) 2 (RJ)m :
Pm
i=1 zi = 0, V (!i)  zi > 0; 8(i; !i) 2 I 
i, with a strict inequality;
(v) If Z = f0g, then, (
i ) = (
i), i.e., (
i) is non-revealing (or arbitrage-free);
(vi) If I 6= I 0 = fi 2 I : 
i 6= 
g, (
i ) = (
i) if and only if the below condition holds:
(II): @(i; z) 2 I 0  Z : V (!)  z > 0; 8! 2 
i, with at least one strict inequality;
(vii) Assume that I 6= I 0, Z 6= f0g and, costlessly for some J1 6 J, that the rst J th1
assets yield a Hamel basis of Z. If fvj(!)gj2f1;:::;J1g;!2Sn
  R+, then, Z = Z
 = f0g
and, moreover, (
i) is fully-revealing if f0g 6= fvj(!)gj2f1;:::;J1g, for each ! 2 Sn
.
4
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Proof (i) Let ! 2 S be given. If w! = 0, then W! = Z?! = f0g. If w! 6= 0, the spaces,
W! and Z?! , are 1-dimensional and contain w!, i.e., coincide. The rest is alike. 
(ii) The relations (
P
i2I Z
?
i )
? = \i2IZi = f0g and (
P
i2I Z
?
i )
? = f0g hold, from the
elimination of redundant assets, hence, RJ =
P
i2I Z
?
i and RJ

=
P
i2I Z
?
i hold. 
(iii) From the above denitions and Assertion (i), the relations Z? = (
P
i2I Zi)
? =
\i2I Z?i = \i2I(
P
!2
i Z
?
! ) = \i2I(
P
!2
i W!) W = Z? hold. Assertion (iii) follows. 
(iv) Assertion (iv) states the AFAO characterization of Claim 1, above, in the
nite dimensional case, proved directly in Cornet-De Boisde¤re (2002, p. 401). 
(v) Assume that Z = f0g and, by contraposition, that (
i) fails to be arbitrage-
free. From Assertion (iv), there exists (zi) 2 (RJ)Inf0g, such that
Pm
i=1 zi = 0 and
V (!)  zi > 0 for every pair (i; !) 2 I 
. These joint relations imply V (!)  zi = 0 for
every (i; !) 2 I 
, that is, (zi) 2 Zmnf0g, contradicting the fact that Z = f0g. This
contradiction proves that (
i) is arbitrage-free, i.e., from Section 2, (
i ) = (
i). 
(vi) Assume, by contraposition, that I 6= I 0, (
i ) = (
i) and Condition (II) of
Assertion (vi) fails. Then, there exists (i; z) 2 I 0Z, such that V (!) z > 0 for all ! 2 
i
and
P
!2
i V (!)  z > 0. One agent, say j 2 InI 0 is fully informed. Then, Condition
(I) of Assertion (iv) fails with (zi; zj) = (z; z), that is, (
i) fails to be arbitrage-
free, which contradicts the above relation, (
i ) = (
i). This contradiction shows the
relation (
i ) = (
i) implies Condition (II) to hold. Assume, now, that (
i ) 6= (
i).
From Assertion (iv) and the proof of Assertion (v), there exists (zi) 2 (Z)m, such that
V (!i)zi > 0 for each (i; !i) 2 I
i, with one strict inequality, hence, Condition (II)
fails. This proves that Condition (II) implies the relation (
i ) = (
i) to hold. 
(vii) Assertion (vii) stems from Assertion (vi) and redundant asset elimination. 
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We now extend Claim 3 to the general setting, eased by the fact that all vector
spaces, dened below, are nite dimensional, hence, have orthogonal supplements.
We let S :=[i2I
i, S:=[i2I
i and derive the mappings V : ! 2 S 7! V (!) := (vj(!))j2f1;:::;Jg
and V : ! 2 S 7! V (!) := (vj(!))j2f1;:::;Jg, from the one in Section 2, where we obtain
J and J 6 J by eliminating redundant assets, if any.
For each agent, i 2 I, and every state, !, in S or S, we dene, in the general
model, the vector spaces, Z!, Z!, W!, W !, Zi, Zi , Z, Z, Z, Z
 and their orthogonals,
in the same way as above (for the nite economy), and, similarly, the vector spaces,
W := f z 2 RJ : 9f 2 L2(), the Riesz space, such that z =
R
!2
 V (!)f(!)d(!) g and
W , for any belief, , having 
 for support, and their orthogonals, W? and W ?.
Claim 3 may be restated, as is, in the general model, relative to the latter vector
spaces. We let the reader check that all its Assertions hold, mutatis mutandis, and
have similar proofs, in the general model, because all above dened vector spaces,
or orthogonals, have a nite Hamel basis, in either sets fV (!)g!2S or fV (!)g!2S . 
4 Conclusion
Claim 3 and its extension to the general model show that the information markets
may reveal depends crucially on the span of assetspayo¤s in commonly expected
states. Thus, if W = Z? = RJ , nancial markets are non-revealing. In economies
where real assets are exchanged and agents have many common forecasts (includ-
ing price forecasts), markets are, thus, typically non-informative (with W = RJ).
Contrarily, nancial markets insuring primarily idiosyncratic risks (with W 6= RJ),
would typically be fully revealing, if one agent has full information (along Claim 4-
(vii)), or partially revealing otherwise. In particular, in the De Boisde¤re (2016, [4])
6
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model, markets would be non-revealing (with W = RJ), because the set of common
forecasts, 
, and the span of payo¤s are typically large.
In the latter economy, equilibrium exists - whatever the beliefs, (i )i2I - if the
set 
 := \i2I 
i includes a so-called "minimum incertainty set", , which features
the uncertainty agents could face on future prices, because their forecasts and be-
liefs are all private. This set, , embeds, among others, all stantard (normalized)
perfect foresight equilibrium prices, when they exist. Studying its cardinality, would
certainly provide additional insights on the information that markets may convey.
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